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Abstract
The human tendency to cooperate with nonkin even in short-run relationships re-
mains a puzzle. Recently it has been hypothesized that altruism may be a byproduct
of “mentalizing”, the process of understanding and predicting the mental states of
others. Another idea is based on sexual selection: altruism is a costly signal of good
genes. The paper shows that these two arguments are stronger when combined in
that altruists who can mentalize have a greater advantage over non-altruists when
they can signal their type, even though these signals are costly. Further, once such
an equilibrium is established, altruists will not be supplanted by mutants who have
similar mentalizing abilities but who lack altruism.
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1 Introduction
One of the biggest puzzles in social science remains that of understanding cooperation
in human society. Existing explanations have usually been based either on the theory of
inclusive fitness or on the theory of repeated games. Yet, there is much evidence that
people cooperate with unrelated individuals even in short run or one shot encounters.
An alternative theory that sees prosocial activities as an attempt to signal desirability
to potential mates has been proposed by Zahavi (1975) and Miller (2000). This sexual
selection explanation of cooperation has been modelled formally by Gintis, Smith and
Bowles (2001). They demonstrate that an equilibrium exists where a high quality indi-
vidual can successfully signal that quality to potential partners by engaging in costly
prosocial activity. This has been called “competitive altruism” (Roberts, 1998). Griske-
vicius et al. (2007) present supportive experimental evidence for the signalling role of
prosocial behavior. They find that romantic thoughts can increase willingness in men
and women to provide public service (see also Iredale et al. (2008)).
Another recent hypothesis is that altruism is a byproduct of a combination of em-
pathy and a theory of mind. Perceptions of the emotional state of another leads to a
representation of that state in the mind of an observer (de Waal, 2008). Building on this
basic capacity for empathy, humans have the ability, which has been called “mentaliz-
ing”, to reason about others’ mental states. Possession of this ability allows prediction
of others’ actions, which is clearly advantageous. But this consideration of the others’
emotional states may lead us to be other-regarding by default (Singer and Fehr, 2005).
There are problems with both theories. The signalling hypothesis does not explain
why quality is signalled by doing good, when it could be equally well signalled by any
costly activity (a problem noted by Gintis et al. (2001) themselves). After all, the lead-
ing example of sexual selection is the peacock’s tail, where quality is signalled by the
investment of resources into conspicuous waste. Or in a modern social context, why
signal your wealth by giving to charity when you could also do so by conspicuous con-
sumption or simply by burning money? Indeed, Griskevicius et al. (2007) also find that
romantic thoughts increase men’s willingness to engage in conspicuous consumption.
The explanation based on the theory of mind has a different question to answer. Even
if empathy and the theory of mind evolved together, why have they remained linked?
Specifically, since altruism is often costly, why are those individuals who have both
altruism and a theory of mind not evolutionarily supplanted by those who are mentally
sophisticated but not altruistic? There seems to be an unexploited opportunity to take
the benefits without paying the costs.
This paper shows how it might be possible to solve both problems simultaneously.
Suppose prosocial behavior is an equilibrium signal not of quality or wealth but of virtue
or, more specifically, altruism. If the relevant signal is the level of contribution to a public
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good, this solves the signal selection problem as if altruists wish to distinguish them-
selves from non-altruists, it is precisely in giving or contributing to a public good that
they have a comparative advantage.1 Further, since it would be necessary to make these
visible contributions in order to attract favorable matching opportunities, those who did
not undertake such public prosocial activities would not match as well. Thus, those who
have a theory of mind but not altruism, would have to make the same contributions as
altruists, and therefore would have no fitness advantage.
I assume that one group of individuals, contributors can be either altruists or non-
altruists. Contributors have an opportunity to signal their type by their choice of con-
tribution to a public good that will be seen by another group, observers. One possible
interpretation is that the two groups represent the two genders. In any case, the ob-
servers, on the basis of the contributions they have witnessed, then choose with which
contributor to match. Once matched in a pair, a contributor and an observer engage in
a joint project, such as raising children, the success of which depends on the quality of
the observer. A contributor’s fitness depends on the total production of public goods,
minus his own contribution, plus the outcome of this project. Altruists have additional
subjective utility from contributions and thus will contribute more than non-altruists.
However, they may gain more favorable matches, as observers are assumed to prefer to
match with altruists.
Thus, altruists potentially have higher fitness if they can gain more in improved
matching opportunities than they lose in additional costs of contribution. I find that the
net effect is positive if and only if altruism is combined with superior ability in the post-
match project. An example of this would be if altruists were superior at mentalizing and
mentalizing was beneficial.2 It is also shown that if altruists do not have superior ability,
then the equilibrium cost of signaling will be higher than the benefits achieved, and that
altruism will not be evolutionarily stable.
There are two apparent problems with the approach taken in this paper. First, if
altruists have an advantage relative to non-altruists, for example, in mentalizing, is sig-
nalling needed? One might suppose that altruists will supplant non-altruists simply
because they are better. Second, why are altruists not displaced evolutionarily by others
that save unnecessary costs by not behaving altruistically?
In fact, signalling and altruism reinforce each other. First, I show that the advantage
of altruists over non-altruists is larger when there is signalling than when contributions
to the public good are not observed. This is the case even though with signalling altruists
1Millet and Dewitte (2007) find that giving in a public goods game and a separate measure of altruism
are positively related with general intelligence.
2Dunbar and Shultz (2007) suggest that it is the prevalence of pair bonding in long term relationships
in humans that has been important in developing human intelligence. That is, mentalizing is an important
factor in successful pair bonding.
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expend more effort on providing the public good. This is because the extra effort is more
than compensated by the higher returns from the post-match project due to the better
matching that follows once altruists identify themselves by signalling.
Second, signalling prevents altruists being supplanted by non-altruists who are equal
at mentalizing. In a separating signalling equilibrium, any non-altruistic individuals
would be forced to make the same level of prosocial contributions as altruists in order
to gain favorable matches. Thus, they would have no advantage in fitness over altruists.
The approach used here is related to the indirect evolutionary approach that already
has been used to explain human cooperation (Frank (1987), Gu¨th (1995)). Under the
indirect approach, individuals choose rationally given their preferences, but these pref-
erences may not be identical with their objective self-interest or fitness. In particular, they
may have altruistic preferences. But evolution will then select between preferences on
the basis of actual fitness. Recent criticism in economics (Dekel et al. (2007)) of this ap-
proach has focussed on its assumption that agents’ preferences are observable by other
agents. Further, West and Gardner (2010) doubt whether cooperation based on coop-
erative or altruistic types being identifiable could be evolutionary stable: non-altruistic
types with the same external appearance could invade. However, here I do not assume
that individuals’ preferences are observable. Rather, it is only if an individual’s type is
revealed by equilibrium behavior will observers know whether he is an altruist or not.
2 Signalling Altruism
There are n individuals which I will call contributors as all of them have to choose
simultaneously and independently how much to contribute to the production a public
good. Let the contribution of contributor i be xi, then the total contributions will be
∑nj=1 xj and the total amount of the public good be G(∑
n
j=1 xj), where G is a strictly
increasing, smooth concave production function. Let us also assume that G′(0) ≥ 1 and
limx→∞ G′(x) = 0 (simple examples of suitable functions include log x and
√
x).
Following the contributors’ choice of contribution, there will be an opportunity to
match with another set of individuals, whom I will call observers. The observers see the
contributors’ choice of contribution before making their decision about which contribu-
tor to match with. Let the parameter s give the value of the match for the contributor.
As in the indirect evolutionary approach, an individual’s utility may not coincide
with her actual material payoff or fitness. Here, each agent’s fitness is
Φi = −xi + G(
n
∑
j=1
xj) + pi(αi, si) (1)
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which is increasing in the amount of the public good produced less an agent’s contribu-
tion. The final term pi(αi, si) is the return in terms of matching opportunities. How this
is determined will be described later.
In contrast to the material payoff which is the same for all contributors, some con-
tributors have an altruistic preference for the welfare of others. Specifically, the utility of
an individual i will be
Ui = −xi + G(
n
∑
j=1
xj) +
αi
n− 1∑j ∕=i
(G(
n
∑
j=1
xj)− xj) + pi(αi, si) (2)
where αi is an altruism parameter. Importantly, let us assume there are m ≥ 1 individuals
with αH > 0 and n−m with αL = 0. So non-altruists’ (α = 0) utility is identical to their
material payoffs. However, altruists (αH > 0) care positively about the material payoffs
of others, and thus, their preferences are different from their material payoff.
The proportion of altruists and non-altruists is known by all. However, in contrast to
much of the literature using the indirect evolutionary approach, an agent’s type is not
known by the observers or other contributors.
I now turn to how the matching term pi(αi, si) is determined. The fundamental as-
sumption is that each agent’s choice of contribution xi is observed by potential matches.
These observers, possibly members of the opposite sex, cannot see an agent’s type, only
his choice of contribution. Contributors know that their choice of contribution are ob-
served by potential matches.
I assume that observers prefer to match with altruists than with non-altruists. Thus,
with complete information so that contributors’ types were known, altruists would
match better than non-altruists. Specifically, if a contributor’s type was directly observ-
able, an altruist would match with an observer of quality sH and a non-altruist would
have the worse outcome sL < sH.
Further, and this is crucial, the total return to a contributor of type αi from matching
with an observer of quality sj is pi(αi, sj), where pi is a smooth function that is increasing
in both arguments and piαs = ∂2pi/(∂α∂s) > 0. A simple example of such a function is
pi(αi, si) = αisi, the match return is the product of the contributor type and the observer
type. It implies that an altruist αH receives a higher payoff when matching with an
observer of quality sj than a non-altruist would. Further, an increase in match quality
has a bigger effect on the return of an altruist than a non-altruist. This assumption
corresponds with the idea that empathy and mentalizing are positively associated, so
that the altruists are superior at mentalizing and that this gives them a higher return
from matching than non-altruists.
However, as a useful benchmark, I first look at what contribution agents would
choose in the absence of signalling considerations. That is, I look at the Nash equilibrium
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of the public goods game assuming the additional term pi(αi, si) in (2) is independent
of the choice of contribution. For example, it could be zero for both altruists and non-
altruists. Let us call a Nash equilibrium where are altruists make the same choice, and
all the non-altruists choose the same contribution (but not the same as the altruists),
“quasi-symmetric”. Then, there is the following preliminary result.
Proposition 1. Suppose matching success is independent of one’s choice of contribution, then
there is a quasi-symmetric Nash equilibrium in which all m altruists choose the same contribution
x0H > 0 and all n − m non-altruists choose the same contribution x0L = 0. There is no other
quasi-symmetric Nash equilibrium.
Proof: Suppose that all the non-altruists choose zero. Then the altruists have an incentive
to contribute as their marginal incentive to contribute −1+ (1+ αH)G′(0) > 0 is positive
at zero total contribution. Further, as by assumption the marginal product of G falls
to zero as contributions become large, one can increase the quantity chosen by the m
altruists xH up to a level x0H such that
(1+ αH)G′(mx0H) = 1 (3)
and thus the altruists have no incentive to raise their contribution further. But then it
must be that G′(mx0H) < 1 so that the marginal incentive to contribute for the non-
altruists is negative. So, they have no incentive to increase their contribution from zero
and this strategy profile is an equilibrium. Given the concavity of G, if x0L = 0, the contri-
bution x0H that satisfies the equilibrium condition (1+ αH)G
′(mx0H) = 1 is unique. Lastly,
clearly, there is no pair (x0L, x
0
H) with x
0
L > 0 such that both types can be in equilibrium,
as (1+ αH)G′(mx0H + (n−m)x0L) = 1 = G′(mx0H + (n−m)x0L) is an impossibility.
That is, even in the absence of signalling, altruists will contribute more than non-
altruists. The point is this gives a quite natural story about how initial differences in
behavior could arise. One would expect this would have made it easy for observers to
learn how to distinguish types on the basis of their contributions, even before signalling
behavior evolved.
The main results are, first, to show that there exists a separating equilibrium, where
altruists choose a different level of contribution than non-altruists and, therefore, are
identifiable by observers; second, to determine in such an equilibrium which type has
a fitness advantage. For equilibrium, we need a contribution level for the high types
xH and a contribution level for the low types xL where xH > xL such that neither type
wishes to deviate. Given the distinct choices of the two types, in equilibrium observers
will correctly conclude that a contributor choosing xH is an altruist and one choosing xL
is not. Thus, the matching return to the choice xH will be sH and the return to xL will be
sL.3
3To determine the return to a choice of contribution that is neither xH or xL, one must specify appro-
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Consequently, the only way for a low type to obtain the high matching return sH will
be to imitate the high types and choose xH. Thus, the principal incentive compatibility
(IC) condition for a separating equilibrium is that a low type must gain a higher utility
from not imitating, or
U(αL, xH, sH) = −xH +G(X¯)+pi(αL, sH) ≤ −xL +G(X)+pi(αL, sL) = U(αL, xL, sL) (4)
where X is the equilibrium total contribution X = mxH + (n−m)xL, and X¯ is the total
contribution if one low type deviates, or X¯ = (m + 1)xH + (n−m− 1)xL.
Equally, if a high type deviates to any contribution lower than xH, she will only
obtain sL. Given this, the incentive compatibility constraint for a high type not to want
to deviate to a lower contribution xL ∈ [0, xH) will be
−xH + (1+ αH)G(X) + pi(αH, sH) ≥ −xL + (1+ αH)G(X) + pi(αH, sL) (5)
where X = (m− 1)xH + (n−m+ 1)xL or the total contribution if one high type deviates
to xL.4
In fact, it is easy to find contribution levels xH, xL that satisfy these IC conditions
and, therefore, constitute a separating equilibrium. As in the original Spence signalling
model, there will be a continuum of such separating equilibria.5
Proposition 2. For any m such that n > m ≥ 1, there exists an interval [xH, x¯H] such that if
xH ∈ [xH, x¯H] then the pair {xH, xL = 0} satisfy the incentive compatibility conditions (4) and
(5) and therefore constitute a pure strategy separating equilibrium.
Proof: Again define xH as the contribution xH that solves the first IC condition (4) with
equality and define x¯H as the equivalent quantity from the second IC condition (5). We
have xH < x¯H if
G(X¯)−G(X)+pi(αL, sH)−pi(αL, sL) < (1+ αH)(G(X)−G(X))+pi(αH, sH)−pi(αH, sL).
This holds as pi(αL, sH) − pi(αL, sL) < pi(αH, sH) − pi(αH, sL) is true because piαs > 0
by assumption, and because as X¯ − X = X − X = xH − xL, one has G(X) − G(X) ≥
priate out-of-equilibrium beliefs. A sufficient condition for this form of separating equilibrium to hold is
that the observers believe that any agent choosing a contribution xˆ less than xH must be a non-altruist.
For simplicity, this is what I assume.
4There is third incentive compatibility condition that the separating contributions must be at least as
large as would be chosen in the absence of signalling considerations, or xH ≥ x0H , xL ≥ x0L = 0. This
constraint would only be relevant if the parameter αH is large relative to the size of possible improved
matching sH − sL, but this case is neither plausible nor interesting. So, if xH is the contribution that solves
the IC condition (4), in what follows I assume that xH > x0H .
5And there will be a continuum of pooling equilibria too. I do not discuss pooling equilibria here, but
the analysis would be similar to that found below in the section on non-observability.
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G(X¯) − G(X) by the concavity of G. Combined with αH > 0, the above inequality
clearly holds. So, the interval [xH, x¯H] is non-empty and so both IC conditions can be
satisfied simultaneously.
The non-altruists receive the same matching payoff pi(αL, sL) for any choice of x in
[0, xH) and do not wish to switch to any x in [xH, x¯H] because of IC condition (4). By
assumption the altruists’ contributions are higher than x0H, the amount chosen in the
absence of signalling considerations. Thus, for the non-altruists the marginal return to
contribution is even lower and so the result in Proposition 1 is easily adapted to show
that non-altruists’ optimal choice is still to contribute zero.
What is important is that in this separating equilibrium, altruists can have a higher
material payoff than non-altruists. In such a separating equilibrium, we have material
payoffs
ΦH = −xH + G(X) + pi(αH, sH) (6)
and
ΦL = −xL + G(X) + pi(αL, sL). (7)
Combining these, the material advantage of the high type is
ΦH −ΦL = pi(αH, sH)− pi(αL, sL)− (xH − xL) (8)
This could be positive or negative depending on the relative size of pi(αH, sH)−pi(αL, sL)
(which is positive) and xH − xL. What I now show is that even in the separating equi-
librium that is worst for altruists, altruists will have a higher material payoff than non-
altruists, provided the number of altruists is sufficiently large.
Proposition 3. Under the assumption that altruists gain a higher return to pair-bonding than
non-altruists, if the number of altruists, m, is sufficiently large, then in any separating equilib-
rium the material payoff to altruists is higher than to non-altruists.
Proof: If the second IC condition (5) holds with equality, so that we have the separating
equilibrium that is worst for altruists, the difference in contributions will be:
xH − xL = pi(αH, sH)− pi(αH, sL) + (1+ αH)(G(X)− G(X)). (9)
Then combining (9) with the equation (8), the advantage becomes
ΦH −ΦL = pi(αH, sL)− pi(αL, sL)− (1+ αH)(G(X)− G(X)) (10)
In the equation (10), the term A = pi(αH, sH)− pi(αL, sL) is a positive constant, while the
term B = −(1+ αH)(G(X)− G(X)) is negative and for a fixed xH, by concavity of G(⋅),
is decreasing in m the number of altruists. Further, by assumption limx→∞ G′(x) = 0. So
if I can show that X = mxH goes to infinity as m becomes large, then B is less than A in
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absolute size, and thus the high type has a material advantage, for m sufficiently large.
The problem is that xH depends on m. But one has
G(X¯)− G(X) + pi(αL, sH)− pi(αL, sL) ≤ xH
so that xH is bounded below as pi(αL, sH)−pi(αL, sL) > 0 by assumption. Thus, limm→∞ mxH =
∞ and limm→∞ G(X)− G(X) = 0.
Thus, if the number of altruists is large, altruists certainly have a material payoff
advantage. But note this result does not rule out that altruists will be advantaged even
with small numbers. Indeed, altruists will do worse at very low numbers of altruists
due to an implausible mechanism. The difference G(X)− G(X) has to be so big that the
level of contribution xH by altruists is enormous.
However, notice that this result does depend on the assumption that the benefits to
the match pi(α, s) are increasing in the degree of altruism. If not, then it is still possible
for altruists to distinguish themselves from non-altruists by signalling. However, in any
separating equilibrium, the material payoff of altruists is lower than that of the non-
altruists.
Proposition 4. Under the alternative assumption that pi(αi, si) = si, there is no benefit from
altruism in pair-bonding, in any separating equilibrium altruists have strictly lower material
payoffs than non-altruists.
Proof: As X¯ > X, clearly
−xH + G(X¯) + sH > −xH + G(X) + sH
Simply combining this with the first IC condition (4), we have that, in the separating
equilibrium that is best for altruists, material payoffs must satisfy
ΦH = −xH + G(X) + sH < −xL + G(X) + sL = ΦL (11)
That is, altruists have a lower material payoff.
This results means that, in the absence of superior mentalizing ability, altruists would
become extinct. Note the intuition for this result. The incentive compatibility condition is
exactly that the non-altruists do not want to imitate the altruists. The difference between
altruist and non-altruists is now only in preferences not in capabilities. Thus, because
the preferences of non-altruists are identical to their material payoff, this means that
necessarily they must earn a higher material payoff from the lower level of contribution
if they prefer it to a higher level.
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3 When Contributions are not Observable
In this section, I look at the case where altruists are assumed to be more productive,
but where their contributions to the public good is not observed. The question is how
this case compares to the signalling outcome of the previous section. The comparison
would seem to be ambiguous: when not observed, altruists will have lower costs of
contribution, but lower quality matching, as observers will not be able to distinguish
altruists. This is, in fact, not the case. Instead, I show that altruists are always better off
with signalling.
When not observed, altruists will still contribute more than non-altruists. Specifically,
altruists will choose x0H as specified in Proposition 1, the privately optimal contribution
for the altruist type, and non-altruists will choose x0L = 0. Since observers now cannot
distinguish between altruists and non-altruists, both type of contribution obtain in ex-
pectation a match of intermediate value sM where sL < sM < sH. So, the material payoff
to the altruists will be
ΦNH = −x0H + G(X) + pi(αH, sM) (12)
and to the non-altruists.
ΦNL = G(X) + pi(αL, sM) (13)
with the N superscript indicating non-observability.
So the advantage to the altruists under non-observability is the difference,
AN = ΦNH −ΦNL = pi(αH, sM)− pi(αL, sM)− x0H. (14)
In contrast, the advantage to the altruists under the most advantageous separating equi-
librium would be, using (4) and (8),
AS = ΦSH −ΦSL = pi(αH, sH)− pi(αL, sH)− (G(X¯)− G(X)) (15)
where S is for separating.
It is easy to show that both AN and AS are increasing in m the number of altruists.
But importantly, one can also show that the advantage to altruists with signalling is
always greater than without observability. This is not obvious as, while with signalling
there is more accurate sorting so that altruists match better, with signalling altruists also
have to contribute more. What is crucial here is the assumption that piαs > 0, that is,
increasing α increases the return to improving one’s match.
Proposition 5. The advantage to the altruists in a separating equilibrium AS is greater than the
advantage without observability AN.
Proof: In comparing AN in (14) and AS in (15), let us first consider the returns to the
post-match project. Note that pi(αH, sH)−pi(αL, sH) > pi(αH, sM)−pi(αL, sM) as piαs > 0.
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Second, consider the cost of contributions. From (3), one has that G′(mx0H) = 1/(1 +
αH) < 1. Further, the slope of G is decreasing in contributions as G is concave. Thus,
G((m + 1)x0H)− G(mx0H) < x0H. Finally, as by assumption x0H < xH, and again because
of the concavity of G, it holds that G(X¯)− G(X) = G((m + 1)xH)− G(mxH) < x0H and
the result follows. □
Crucially, what this result shows is possible that without signalling, altruism might
not be able to establish itself. For example, it might be the case that AS > 0 > AN, when
the number of altruists is small. If this is the case, then under signalling, altruism would
spread within the population, but without signalling it would go extinct. Let us see an
example of this.
Example 1. Let pi(α, s) = (1+ α)s and G(x) = ln x, and further αH = 1/2 and sL, sM, sH
be 1, 3/2, 2 respectively. Then, x0H = (1 + αH)/m = 3/2m and, thus, A
S = ΦSH −ΦSL =
1− log((m + 1)/m) > 3/4− 3/2m = ΦNH − ΦNL = AN. Indeed, in this example, the
first altruist would fail to establish herself without observability, as non-altruists have
an advantage when there is only one altruist. That is when m = 1, AN = −3/4 < 0,
whereas with signalling the advantage to the lone altruist is positive, AS = 1− log 2 > 0.
4 If Some Non-Altruists Can Mentalize
Let us look at a further possibility: that there exists another type of contributor, who
does not have altruistic preferences but is as capable of mentalizing as altruists. Thus,
this type would be equally competent in the post-match project. This kind of intelligence
without sympathy for others is sometimes called Machiavellian but, more neutrally, let
us call this the P-type. We will see that the outcome is vastly different when there is
signalling and when there is no observability.
Specifically, the P-type has preferences and fitness
UP = ΦP = −xi + G(
n
∑
j=1
xj) + pi(αH, si). (16)
That is, he has no altruism as his preferences match his fitness, but he has high produc-
tivity pi in any match. Without observation, the P-type will choose x0P = 0 but gain a
product of pi(αH, sM), where sM is as in the previous section on non-observability. Thus,
the fitness of the P-type will be
ΦP = G(X) + pi(αH, sM) (17)
which is clearly greater than the fitness of the altruists ΦNH or of the non-altruists Φ
N
L ,
as defined in (12) and (13) in the previous section. Thus, without observation, the result
will be a population consisting entirely of P-types.
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In contrast, where observers do view the choice of contribution, the P-type would
have a choice between the high contribution of the altruists and the low contribution
of the non-altruists (remember that as part of the separating equilibrium, it must be
that a choice of some intermediate level of contribution is interpreted as coming from
a non-altruist). The high contribution gives a better match and the net fitness is higher
than from the low choice, by Proposition 3. Thus, the P-types would choose the high
contribution. But note that the P-type now does no better than the altruist. That is,
ΦP = −xH + G(X) + pi(αH, sH) = ΦH, (18)
where ΦH is the material payoff to the altruist as given in (6).
Furthermore, there is no separating equilibrium where the P-types choose some inter-
mediate level of contribution xˆ ∈ (0, xH) and separate themselves both from the altruists
and the low ability non-altruists. This is because, the contribution xH is the minimum
level of contribution that is high enough to deter the low types from also choosing to
contribute.
This results suggests the following. Suppose mentalizing and empathy did arise to-
gether, and those with these joint characteristics started to signal to identify themselves.
Then, it might seem that such types would be invadable by a type that could mental-
ize but avoided the costs of altruism. However, once signalling is in place, such a type
would do no better than altruists as it would have to engage in just as much prosocial
behavior in order to match well.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, I have shown the following. If having a theory of mind, “mentalizing”,
is positively associated with empathy, then those possessing these joint attributes can
signal this otherwise hidden capability by prosocial behavior. Once such a signalling
equilibrium is established, individuals who are able to mentalize but lack altruism would
not be able to supplant those with both characteristics. However, in the absence of
signalling, altruists would be driven extinct by those who mentalize but who do not
empathize.
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